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1783 




At the American founding, the nation was an idea and, constitutionally 
speaking, an immensely important one.  Yet, it has been easy to ignore or 
overlook.  Sometimes its existence is taken for granted without much 
additional reflection.  The nation was simply proclaimed by the Declaration 
of Independence and then realized through the war with Great Britain, 
thereafter an undeniable reality.1  Or, at other times, it has been assumed that 
the American Revolution failed to produce a nation, at least not a real one 
anyway.2  Rather than creating a genuine nation-state, drawing on their 
colonial past, the revolutionaries erected a confederacy of autonomous states, 
held together by a “peace pact” or “federal treaty.”3  By the terms of this 
treaty, independent states confederated to project strength outward and 
minimize interstate conflict without surrendering their essential sovereign 
prerogatives.4  While the impotent Confederation government managed 
diplomacy, the real work of polity building that followed independence lay 
with the states, which jealously guarded their corporate identities, 
independent powers, and sovereign rights.5  Even if the federal Constitution 
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 1. On the Declaration of Independence as principally a statement of nationhood, see 
generally DAVID ARMITAGE, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE:  A GLOBAL HISTORY 
(2007). 
 2. See DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, PEACE PACT:  THE LOST WORLD OF THE AMERICAN 
FOUNDING ix–x, xiv, 257–58 (2003); Jack P. Greene, Colonial History and National History:  
Reflections on a Continuing Problem, 64 WM. & MARY Q. 235, 242–50 (2007); Peter S. Onuf, 
A Declaration of Independence for Diplomatic Historians, 22 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 71, 71–72, 
79–83 (1998). 
 3. See generally HENDRICKSON, supra note 2; Max M. Edling, Peace Pact and Nation:  
An International Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, 240 PAST & PRESENT 
267 (2018). 
 4. See Edling, supra note 3, at 281–83; see also HENDRICKSON, supra note 2, at 24–29, 
104–11, 125–26, 145–46; Greene, supra note 2, at 242–43; Onuf, supra note 2, at 72–73, 76–
78. 
 5. See JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER:  CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN 
THE EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES, 1607–1788, at 172–
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of 1787 marked a remaking of the state-centered order, it did not 
fundamentally change—nor seek to change—the original purpose or aims of 
the original confederation.6  The American states joined in a perpetual union 
and empowered a central government to promote the common defense, 
manage diplomacy, and regulate international trade but not to meddle in 
domestic matters—those would remain firmly within the province of the 
states, which is ultimately where most citizens’ true loyalties lay.7  The early 
United States, thus, more closely resembled a states system than a nation-
state.8  Only much later would this conception of federal union give way to 
the idea of a unitary American nation.9 
While no doubt many founding-era Americans viewed the Union in such 
diffuse terms and while, practically speaking, the Union might well have 
functioned in such a decentralized manner, we should not overlook why some 
revolutionaries—especially those who would become leading 
Federalists10—invested so much energy trying to establish the nation’s 
 
80 (1986); MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION:  AN INTERPRETATION OF THE 
SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1774–1781, at 14–15, 
109–10, 161–76, 239–45 (1970); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 127–34, 355–59, 463–67 (2d ed. 1998). 
 6. Edling, supra note 3, at 284–91; see also HENDRICKSON, supra note 2, at xiv, 3–7, 
242–48, 257–59; Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The International Law Origins 
of American Federalism, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 835, 857–71 (2020); Daniel H. Deudney, The 
Philadelphian System:  Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American 
States-Union, Circa 1787–1861, 49 INT’L ORG. 191, 194–216 (1995); Greene, supra note 2, 
at 243–45; Onuf, supra note 2, at 78–83; Robbie J. Totten, Security, Two Diplomacies, and 
the Formation of the U.S. Constitution:  Review, Interpretation, and New Directions for the 
Study of the Early American Period, 36 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 77, 77–80, 89–110 (2012); Michael 
P. Zuckert, Federalism and the Founding:  Toward a Reinterpretation of the Constitutional 
Convention, 48 REV. POL. 166, 174–75 (1986).  See generally AARON N. COLEMAN, THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, STATE SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
SETTLEMENT, 1765–1800 (2016); FORREST MCDONALD, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION:  
IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 1776–1876 (2000); PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, 
MODERN WORLD:  THE LAW OF NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS 1776–1814 (1993). 
 7. Edling, supra note 3, at 287.  On the intellectual roots of American federalism, see 
generally ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010).  
On the lack of national identity at the time of the founding, see GREENE, supra note 5, at 157–
65; FORREST MCDONALD, E PLURIBUS UNUM:  THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 
1776–1790, at 17–18 (2d ed. 1979); John M. Murrin, A Roof Without Walls:  The Dilemma of 
American National Identity, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION:  ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND 
AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 333 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987). 
 8. See HENDRICKSON, supra note 2, at ix–xii; Deudney, supra note 6, at 194, 208–09, 
222; Totten, supra note 6, at 79–80, 111, 113–14. 
 9. See HENDRICKSON, supra note 2, at 281–97. 
 10. In this Article, for convenience, I mostly use the terms “Federalist” and “nationalist” 
interchangeably.  At times, though, I hint at the ways in which they picked out distinct groups 
of individuals at the founding.  “Federalists” could describe both those who supported the 
Constitution’s ratification and members of the nascent political party that took form over the 
course of the subsequent decade that supported President George Washington’s administration 
and Alexander Hamilton’s controversial financial plan.  Some Federalists of the first variety, 
such as James Madison, became leading opponents of the later Federalists.  Most Federalists, 
of either kind, were nationalists.  But some were assuredly more committed to expansive 
national power than were others, especially during ratification.  When I use the term 
“nationalists,” I do so to refer either to those individuals who championed increasing the power 
of the national government prior to the Constitutional Convention (and thus, before the term 
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existence.  Leading Federalists, many of whom played as significant a role 
in creating the Constitution as anybody, fervently rejected the idea that the 
Constitutional Convention had created a mere treaty.  This was no modest 
quibble over names or forms, either.  The difference between the 
Constitution, as they imagined it, and a treaty was vast and significant.  
Constitutionally and legally speaking, few differences mattered more.  
Federalists’ search for nationhood—as well as its implications and 
consequences—thus deserves further attention.  Understanding why they 
conducted this intellectual work and how successfully they grounded their 
claims in commonly held assumptions illuminates an obscured dimension of 
founding-era constitutional thinking.  It gives us new reason to emphasize 
the importance of nationhood at the founding and to not be so quick to 
assume that devolved federalism and localism were the shared commitments 
of the day. 
In various ways, scholars have already helped point us in this direction.  A 
recent wave of important work has called attention to the neglected 
importance of early American nationhood and constitutional governance.11  
Some have stressed that the ostensibly weak national government was 
actually far stronger and more capable than previously assumed.12  Others 
have shown how, following ratification of the Constitution, state and federal 
centralization were not at odds but worked in tandem, as national authority 
helped states concentrate their power.13  Still others have demonstrated 
powerfully how Federalists’ pursuit of international recognition led them to 
emphasize the legal foundation of nationhood.14  What also deserves 
 
Federalist had emerged) or, alternatively, to those Federalists who most energetically 
championed a powerful national government. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE 
AGE OF FEDERALISM:  THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788–1800, at 21–24 (1993) 
(discussing the differences between early and later Federalism).  See generally David M. 
Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation:  The Early American Constitution, the 
Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2010) 
(describing how leading Federalists at this time were strong nationalists). 
 11. For a comprehensive overview, see generally Gautham Rao, The New Historiography 
of the Early Federal Government:  Institutions, Contexts, and the Imperial State, 77 WM. & 
MARY Q. 97 (2020). 
 12. See generally GREGORY ABLAVSKY, FEDERAL GROUND:  GOVERNING PROPERTY AND 
VIOLENCE IN THE FIRST U.S. TERRITORIES (2021); BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF 
SIGHT:  THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL AUTHORITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2009); 
MAX M. EDLING, A HERCULES IN THE CRADLE:  WAR, MONEY, AND THE AMERICAN STATE, 
1783–1867 (2014); RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS:  THE AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM 
FROM FRANKLIN TO MORSE (1995); JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONSTITUTION:  THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012); 
GAUTHAM RAO, NATIONAL DUTIES:  CUSTOMS HOUSES AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN 
STATE (2016); LINDSAY SCHAKENBACH REGELE, MANUFACTURING ADVANTAGE:  WAR, THE 
STATE, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1776–1848 (2019); Andrew J. B. Fagal, 
American Arms Manufacturing and the Onset of the War of 1812, 87 NEW ENG. Q. 526 (2014); 
Richard R. John, Governmental Institutions as Agents of Change:  Rethinking American 
Political Development in the Early Republic, 1787–1835, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 347 (1997). 
 13. See generally Gregory Ablavsky, Empire States:  The Coming of Dual Federalism, 
128 YALE L.J. 1792 (2019). 
 14. See generally ELIGA H. GOULD, AMONG THE POWERS OF THE EARTH:  THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION AND THE MAKING OF A NEW WORLD EMPIRE (2012); Golove & Hulsebosch, supra 
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attention is how defenses of national power were imagined and justified at 
the founding.  On this front, several scholars have begun to underscore key 
facets of early nationalist constitutionalism that have long been downplayed 
or ignored, facets that point to a robust and ascendant Federalist Constitution 
in the nation’s earliest years that seriously disrupts the enduring portrait of 
the period’s constitutionalism.15 
To further flesh out this Federalist Constitution that recent scholarship has 
begun to bring back into view, I focus on one particularly vital argument that 
founding-era nationalists relied on:  that the existence of a national social 
contract entitled the national government to expansive power.  Leading 
politicians and jurists, such as Alexander Hamilton, James Wilson, John Jay, 
John Adams, Gouverneur Morris, Rufus King, and Fisher Ames, made 
creative use of social contract theory, tapping into what was, at the time, a 
ubiquitous intellectual resource—that otherwise provided a pervasive 
framework for understanding the nature of political society and the 
foundations of constitutional authority—and turning it to their advantage.  
While scholars of the founding have long attended to the place of social 
contract theory in revolutionary American political and constitutional 
discourse, they have almost always interpreted it as a mechanism for 
 
note 10; Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Being Seen Like a State:  How Americans (and Britons) Built 
the Constitutional Infrastructure of a Developing Nation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1239 
(2018); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Revolutionary Portfolio:  Constitution-Making and the 
Wider World in the American Revolution, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 759 (2014). 
 15. See generally, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV 1 (2010); Jonathan 
Gienapp, The Myth of the Constitutional Given:  Enumeration and National Power at the 
Founding, 69 AM. U. L. REV. F. 183 (2020) [hereinafter Gienapp, The Myth of the 
Constitutional Given]; Jonathan Gienapp, National Power and the Presidency:  Rival Forms 
of Federalist Constitutionalism at the Founding, in POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ORIGINS OF 
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 127 (Ben Lowe ed. 2021) [hereinafter Gienapp, National Power 
and the Presidency]; Calvin H. Johnson, The Dubious Enumerated Power Doctrine, 22 
CONST. COMMENT. 25 (2005); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Inherent National Sovereignty 
Constitutionalism:  An Original Understanding of the U.S. Constitution, 101 MINN. L. REV. 
699 (2016); John Mikhail, The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language:  Entailment, 
Implicature, and Implied Powers, 101 VA. L. REV. 1063 (2015) [hereinafter Mikhail, The 
Constitution and the Philosophy of Language]; John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper 
Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045 (2014) [hereinafter Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses]; 
Richard Primus, Herein of “Herein Granted”:  Why Article I’s Vesting Clause Does Not 
Support the Doctrine of Enumerated Powers, 35 CONST. COMMENT. 301 (2020); Richard 
Primus, “The Essential Characteristic”:  Enumerated Powers and the Bank of the United 
States, 117 MICH. L. REV. 415 (2018); Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE 
L.J. 576 (2014); Richard Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2016); 
Robert J. Reinstein, The Aggregate and Implied Powers of the United States, 69 AM. U. L. 
REV. 3 (2019); David S. Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising:  Implied Powers, Capable 
Federalism, and the Limits of Enumerationism, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 573 (2017); David S. 
Schwartz, McCulloch v. Maryland and the Incoherence of Enumerationism, 19 GEO. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=3535750 [https://perma.cc/VV45-SSFZ]; David S. Schwartz, Recovering the Lost 
General Welfare Clause (Univ. of Wis. L. Sch. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series No. 1603, 
2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3671883 [https://perma.cc/LAB2 
-NUF6]. 
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protecting rights and limiting government power.16  Only rarely have 
scholars considered how social contract thinking helped expand 
governmental authority based on what it revealed about the interconnected 
implications of sovereignty, polity formation, and constitutional power.  Yet, 
in the hands of early nationalists, this was one of social contract theory’s most 
vital roles. 
At the founding, Federalists contended that there was a tight, inextricable 
relationship between the nature of the federal union and the character and 
scope of governmental power—that the latter could not be understood apart 
from the former.  If, as a matter of legal fact, the United States was a nation, 
then its government enjoyed a credible claim to more power than might 
otherwise be assumed.  If, however, the United States was not a nation, then 
its government necessarily was entitled to less power.  What the Constitution 
permitted was determined, to a meaningful extent, by the nature of the 
underlying polity.  In the early years of the republic, to an extent that is rarely 
appreciated, this argument held a tight grip on constitutional thinking.  Not 
only did nationalists champion the idea but, arguably even more importantly, 
their opponents fully recognized its power.  Precisely because Federalists 
built their account of national authority on such an authoritative foundation, 
and precisely because their starting point enjoyed such broad resonance 
across ideological divisions, their arguments had a clear impact on their 
intellectual and political rivals.  These opponents recognized that defeating 
the Federalist account of national power meant undermining their attendant 
account of the social contract.  Not everybody agreed with the Federalists 
that the United States was a nation, but most everybody agreed on why that 
fact was constitutionally important. 
This dimension of Federalist constitutionalism and the ways in which it 
resonated in the early republic are curiously neglected.  We know a great deal 
about debates during this period over nationhood, the contested nature of the 
federal union, social contract theory, and popular sovereignty.  We know far 
less, however, about the ways in which each of these debates was 
interconnected—how a particular account of the national social contract 
bolstered a broad conception of national power.  The burden of what follows 
is to bring these connections and the once pervasive, if now less familiar, 
kinds of constitutional arguments that they yielded back into focus in order 
to underscore their original significance.  They illuminate a now forgotten 
 
 16. See generally, e.g., SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS:  THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1995); THOMAS L. 
PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM:  THE MORAL VISION OF THE AMERICAN 
FOUNDERS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE (1988); C. BRADLEY THOMPSON, AMERICA’S 
REVOLUTIONARY MIND:  A MORAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE 
DECLARATION THAT DEFINED IT (2019); THOMAS G. WEST, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE 
AMERICAN FOUNDING:  NATURAL RIGHTS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE MORAL CONDITIONS OF 
FREEDOM (2017); MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC:  STUDIES IN THE 
FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1996); Philip A. Hamburger, Natural 
Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907 (1993). 
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way of thinking about constitutionalism that was once inextricably 
intertwined with the original Constitution. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I examines social contract theory, 
considering the ways in which it is often misunderstood.  Rather than simply 
placing limits on government power, at the founding, this form of thinking 
helped empower government to act in the general welfare.  Parts II and III 
discuss how founding-era nationalists leveraged social contract theory to 
support their expansive vision of national power up through the drafting of 
the federal Constitution.  Part IV investigates how, during ratification, 
Federalists and anti-Federalists debated what the proposed Constitution 
implied about the nature of the federal union.  Part V demonstrates how 
readily Federalists, following ratification, claimed that debates over national 
power under the Constitution ultimately turned on the character of the United 
States itself.  Part VI shows how Republicans, despite sharply disagreeing 
with Federalists’ conclusions about national power, nonetheless agreed with 
their guiding premise:  that the national government’s authority was 
determined by the kind of polity it represented.  Ultimately, whether or not 
the United States was a nation made a decisive difference.  From the 
standpoint of constitutionalism, Federalists effectively argued that the scope 
of the national government’s power was a function of the kind of union it 
governed.  And remarkably, to an extent seldom appreciated, their opponents 
agreed.  The concept of nationhood was central to founding-era constitutional 
thought and, if we seek to understand the original Constitution on its own 
terms, we must understand why this was. 
I.  SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY AT THE FOUNDING 
Federalists’ interest in nationhood owed a great deal to how they thought 
about polity formation and the origins of the social compact—the underlying 
foundations of the constitutional regime.  It was here that social contract 
theory played such a foundational role in their arguments. 
Understanding how requires first appreciating what prior study of this 
subject has missed.  There is, of course, nothing novel in claiming that social 
contract thinking—which was utterly ubiquitous in early modern European 
political theory—informed Revolutionary-era American political thought.17  
Yet, virtually all attention that has been paid to this kind of founding-era 
thinking has focused on the protection of individual rights or the cordoning 
off of certain spheres of liberty and thus on limitations on government 
power.18  Social contract theory was built on a thought experiment designed 
to understand why human beings would have left a hypothetical state of 
nature, in which they enjoyed natural liberty, for the protections of 
government.19  People would have done so, students of this theory often 
 
 17. See, e.g., supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 18. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 19. Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST. 
COMMENT. 85, 87–88 (2017) (reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN 
CONSTITUTION:  SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE 31–82 (2016)). 
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emphasize, to ensure protection of their individual natural rights.20  
Government, therefore, is best understood as a contract predicated on 
consent—a bargain made to sacrifice some liberty to ensure that the 
remainder is safely guarded.21  By these terms, government power is 
inherently constrained and limited, and its exercise is to be watched with 
relentless suspicion.  In short, on this view, social contract theory offered an 
account of limited government.  Hardly any attention, however, has been 
given to the ways in which, in the hands of certain founding-era Americans, 
social contract thinking served to expand government power.22  This is an 
oversight that both misses the thrust of social contract theory at the founding 
and the far-reaching uses to which some leading founders put it. 
Analyses of founding-era social contract thinking have often narrowly 
focused on rights and limitations to government power because, too often, 
they are infected with anachronism.  They tend to be tacitly guided by the 
modern libertarian presumption that liberty and state power are inherently at 
odds—locked in a zero-sum game.23  Where government acts, liberty is 
threatened, meaning the state should strive to do the minimum necessary to 
maintain order and the rule of law without interfering with the retained rights 
of consenting citizens—who only would have parted with certain kinds of 
natural liberty to secure the reliance and consistency that regular legal order 
alone could provide.24  This is why the founding generation purportedly 
conceived of rights as trumps against the government.25  No matter how 
popular these assumptions are today or how frequently they are imposed on 
the founding, they would have made little sense in the eighteenth century. 
At that time, power and liberty were not believed to be inherently at odds.  
To be sure, it was widely assumed that liberty was fragile and always under 
threat and that unchecked, tyrannical power was always quick to destroy it.26  
However, one protected liberty not by disabling government power but rather 
by empowering government in the right kind of way.  This meant, above all, 
constructing representative institutions that, by embodying the people’s will, 
protected the people’s liberty.27  There was, in fact, no solution to the 
problem of liberty other than robust political institutions. 
 
 20. See, e.g., ZUCKERT, supra note 16, at 24–31. 
 21. Id. at 27–29. 
 22. Jud Campbell’s work, which has done so much to illuminate social contract thinking 
at the founding, is an important exception.  Even so, Campbell has primarily focused on the 
nature of rights at the founding and only gestured toward the ways in which some founders 
harnessed social contract thinking to defend the robust exercise of government power.  For 
one of these brief forays, see Campbell, supra note 19, at 101–03, 109–11.  My argument is 
indebted to his analysis of eighteenth-century social contract thinking. 
 23. See BARNETT, supra note 19, at 31–82; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL 
CONSTITUTION:  THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 3–6, 17–25 (2014); Philip 
Hamburger, The Inversion of Rights and Power, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 731, 738–52 (2015). 
 24. See BARNETT, supra note 19, at 31–82; EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 3–6, 17–25. 
 25. Hamburger, supra note 23, at 752. 
 26. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 55–93 (enlarged ed. 1992). 
 27. Jonathan Gienapp, Response, The Foreign Founding:  Rights, Fixity, and the Original 
Constitution, 97 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 115, 118–26 (2019).  For the deeper colonial roots of 
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In this regard, our familiar distinctions between individual and collective 
liberty often had little meaning at the founding.  Residents of the eighteenth 
century surely would have recognized how those categories were distinct, but 
they tended to think of them in compatible terms.  One was not protected at 
the expense or denial of the other; instead, protecting one often ensured the 
protection of the other.28  Individual and collective rights to a free press and 
jury trial and to speak freely, assemble, and bear arms were most effectively 
secured by devising and empowering popular institutions that promoted, all 
at once, the people’s liberty, welfare, and happiness.29  The crucial 
distinction was not between government and liberty but between 
representative government (which protected liberty) and unrepresentative 
government (which did not).  “Representation,” proclaimed Moses Mather 
on the eve of the American Revolution, “is the feet upon which a free 
government stands.”30  Liberty was not the absence of coercion but a state of 
being, predicated on living in a free state and, thus, the conditions of that 
state being free.31  Jud Campbell has compellingly demonstrated how 
founding-era Americans reconciled their commitment to retained 
fundamental rights and the power of republican governments to regulate 
those rights in the interest of the public good.32  The latter did not violate 
commitment to the former; rather, it embodied the very essence of freedom.33  
Alexander Hamilton thus described the “great principle of the social 
compact” to be “that the chief object of government is to protect the rights of 
individuals by the united strength of the community.”34  The primary reason 
one studied natural rights and probed the origins of the social compact was 
to identify the kind of government that could act most credibly in the public 
interest.35  As the town of Boston proclaimed in 1772, “[t]he natural Liberty 
of Man, by entering into Society, is abridg’d or restrain’d so far only as is 
necessary for the great End of Society, the best Good of the Whole.”36 
 
this thinking, see generally BARBARA CLARK SMITH, THE FREEDOMS WE LOST:  CONSENT AND 
RESISTANCE IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (2010). 
 28. Gienapp, supra note 27, at 118–26. 
 29. Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 265–66, 
272–87, 304–21 (2017). 
 30. MOSES MATHER, AMERICA’S APPEAL TO THE IMPARTIAL WORLD 70 (Hartford, 
Ebenezer Watson 1775). 
 31. Gienapp, supra note 27, at 125–26.  See generally QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE 
LIBERALISM (1998) (recounting the development of this theory in seventeenth-century 
England and exploring its impact on the early United States). 
 32. Campbell, supra note 29, at 265–66, 272–87, 304–21; Campbell, supra note 19, at 
87–99, 111–12; Jud Campbell, The Invention of First Amendment Federalism, 97 TEX. L. REV. 
517, 525–29 (2019); Jud Campbell, Fundamental Rights at the American Founding 7–9 (Dec. 
9, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 33. JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN LIBERTY 38–39 (2005). 
 34. New York Assembly.  Remarks on an Act Acknowledging the Independence of 
Vermont, DAILY ADVERTISER (N.Y.), Apr. 5, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 126, 126 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1962). 
 35. See id. 
 36. THE VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FREEHOLDERS AND OTHER INHABITANTS OF THE 
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Given this unfamiliar understanding of the relationship between liberty 
and power, social contract theory—although squarely focused on the 
retention and protection of liberty and used to understand the origins of 
political communities with just this aim in mind—had no trouble reconciling 
what we would think of as limited and expansive government.  Government 
was limited through a variety of means, but none more important than 
representation.37  A government that was representative, and thus was 
limited, could claim the power necessary to advance the public good—and, 
indeed, often had a duty to do so.38  In the context of the American founding, 
social contract theory was, therefore, not simply or even primarily 
preoccupied with curbing government power but rather focused on offering 
a basis for the legitimate exercise of government power, thus realizing the 
fundamental aim of republican political organization.39 
Because liberty was so entangled with representation, it mattered 
enormously for whom the government spoke—whom it could claim to 
embody and mirror.40  Determining whom the government represented, and 
thus could act in the name of to pursue the public good, invited consideration 
of how the public related to its government.  Here, social contract theory, 
given how it conceived of the origins and nature of the political community, 
provided potent answers. 
Social contract theory furnished a conceptual framework for thinking 
about the basis of governance.  It imagined a two-step process in which 
individuals formed, first, a social compact (a body politic) and then second, 
a system of government (a constitution).41  “The first ‘collection’ of 
authority,” John Adams explained, was an “agreement” among individuals 
“to form themselves into a nation, people, community, or body politic.”42  
Alexander Hamilton, in his 1775 pamphlet, The Farmer Refuted, claimed 
similarly that “the origin of all civil government, justly established, must be 
a voluntary compact.”43  “When Men enter into Society,” declared the town 
of Boston shortly before Americans declared independence, “by voluntary 
 
 37. See Campbell, supra note 19, at 96–98; Gienapp, supra note 27, at 125–26. 
 38. On the importance of the public good at the founding, see JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, 
TOWARD DEMOCRACY:  THE STRUGGLE FOR SELF-RULE IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN 
THOUGHT 337–38, 349–55, 428–33 (2016); WOOD, supra note 5, at 53–65, 179–80. 
 39. Campbell, supra note 19, at 87–99, 111–12; Gienapp, supra note 27, at 118–26. 
 40. On the logic of political representation at the founding and how it often emphasized 
the idea of mirroring or re-presenting the people at-large, see ERIC NELSON, THE ROYALIST 
REVOLUTION:  MONARCHY AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 72–75, 78–83, 209–10 (2014); ERIC 
SLAUTER, THE STATE AS A WORK OF ART:  THE CULTURAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 123–
67 (2009).  For characteristic statements from the founding, see JOHN ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON 
GOVERNMENT:  APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT STATE OF THE AMERICAN COLONIES 9–10 
(Philadelphia, John Dunlap 1776); Brutus III, N.Y.J., Nov. 15, 1787, reprinted in 14 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION:  COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION 119, 120–22 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1983). 
 41. Campbell, supra note 19, at 87–90; Donald S. Lutz, From Covenant to Constitution 
in American Political Thought, 10 PUBLIUS 101, 103–06 (1980). 
 42. JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 6 (Philadelphia, Hall & Sellers 1787). 
 43. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED 6 (New York, James Rivington 1775). 
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Consent . . . [they] form an . . . original Compact.”44  The Massachusetts 
Constitution explicitly begins from this premise as well.  Its preamble reads:  
“The body-politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals:  It is a 
social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and 
each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws 
for the common good.”45  The social compact created a polity, the members 
of which then decided on how they would be governed.46 
Step two followed.  “The society being formed,” James Wilson elaborated 
in his Lectures on Law, next came “the formation of [a] government.”47  The 
powers and obligations of the latter flowed from the constitution of the 
former, because the body politic both established the government to act in its 
name and retained sovereignty following that delegation.48  “When the 
society was formed,” Wilson went on, “it possessed jointly all the previously 
separate and independent powers and rights of the individuals who formed 
it,” but it also obtained “all the other powers and rights, which result from 
the social union.”49  The “aggregate of . . . powers” that “compose[d] the 
sovereignty of the society or nation”50 was thus determined, in significant 
measure, by the kind of union that had been formed.51  Different social 
compacts produced different sums of power that were delegated, in turn, to 
the governments presiding over them.52  A government’s power thus 
reflected the nature of the sovereign agent that had given life to it.53 
Throughout the eighteenth century, different writers and commentators 
reached different conclusions about the nature of the social contract, how its 
conceptual pieces fit together, and its implications for political authority.  
But, at the risk of oversimplification, most everybody at the founding agreed 
on the outlines of the framework just sketched.54  And in the hands of 
nationalists in the 1780s—those who soon became Federalists and 
spearheaded the movement for federal constitutional reform—this 
framework held the potential for a dramatic expansion of national power. 
 
 44. VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 36, at 3. 
 45. MASS. CONST. pmbl. 
 46. See id. 
 47. JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, Part 2, Chapter V:  Of Municipal Law, reprinted in 
1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 549, 554 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 
2007). 
 48. See id. at 553–54. 
 49. Id. at 556. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Gienapp, The Myth of the Constitutional Given, supra note 15, at 201; Jud Campbell, 
The Natures of Constitutional Histories, BALKINIZATION (May 1, 2020), https://balkin. 
blogspot.com/2020/05/the-natures-of-constitutional-histories.html [https://perma.cc/H2FM-
242V]. 
 54. See supra notes 41–53 and accompanying text. 
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II.  A NATIONAL PEOPLE, A NATIONAL POLITY:  FINDING THE NATION 
With social contract theory firmly in mind, leading nationalists would 
come to argue that the full scope of national power under the Constitution 
turned on sovereignty and union:  who had authorized the Constitution and 
for what kind of polity did that agent speak?  The nature of the polity and the 
meaning of the Constitution were inextricably entwined.  Without 
understanding the social compact (step one in social contract theory), it was 
impossible to interpret the resulting constitution (step two).  Depending on 
the character of the union, the exact same constitutional provisions might 
yield a different ambit of constitutional power.  It was thus impossible to 
know what the Constitution declared—and therefore licensed or prohibited—
without first understanding the nature of the federal union for which it spoke. 
In the context of the United States, sorting out the character of the polity 
and its attendant sovereignty was complicated by the federal nature of the 
Union.  There was wide agreement that the people were, in some manner, 
sovereign.  During the revolutionary struggle against Britain, Americans had 
rallied around the concept of popular sovereignty; and then, during their 
initial efforts to construct an independent constitutional order, they had 
deepened and refined their understanding of it.55  But, even as a matter of 
constitutional theory, if it was clear that the people wielded sovereign 
authority, in the context of authorizing a national government to preside over 
the nascent American Union, it was much less clear which people delegated 
the relevant authority:  the people of the United States or the people of the 
separate states.  The answer determined whether the body politic was 
rightfully understood to be a union of sovereign states, a nation, or something 
in between.  For those both committed and opposed to a stronger national 
government, these were foundational questions—the ones that needed to be 
answered in order to comprehend the full scope of the federal government’s 
power:  which kind of sovereign people had constituted the government and 
which kind of polity did the Constitution speak for?  Many Federalists would 
come to defend an expansive vision of national power based on the belief 
that the Constitution had been established by a national people who had 
previously formed a national polity.56 
Nationalists began gesturing toward these conclusions throughout the 
1780s as they decried and lamented the feeble state of the Union—
particularly the impotent state of the national government that struggled to 
govern the country or address any of its mounting problems.57  From these 
complaints emerged not just calls for sweeping reform (which would 
 
 55. See WOOD, supra note 5, at 344–89, 445–46, 462–63 (offering the canonical account 
of this concept).  Of course, the accepted notion of the “people” at the time usually referred to 
white men. 
 56. Gienapp, The Myth of the Constitutional Given, supra note 15, at 193–94, 201–04. 
 57. See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP:  THE MAKING OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 11–125 (2016) (discussing the problems of the 1780s and the 
criticisms of the Confederation government that they inspired); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL 
MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 23–34 (1996) (same). 
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eventually win converts toward the end of the decade)58 but also creative 
accounts of the nature of union, ones that claimed that the United States had 
been born a nation.59  In that regard, as soon-to-be Federalists at once called 
for significant constitutional change, they also emphasized what they 
believed already to be the case—that which demanded recognition and 
acceptance, rather than invention:  the idea that, through the act of 
independence, the American people had formed a national social compact.60  
A genuine national government was needed not only to solve the problems 
crippling the Union but also to affirm the kind of political community that 
the Revolution had brought into existence:  “an INDEPENDENT NATION.”61 
As one of the earliest critics of the Confederation government and boldest 
champions of national power, Alexander Hamilton was among the first to 
suggest that, no matter the “want of power in Congress,”62 the “want of 
method and energy in the administration,”63 or the myriad other ways in 
which the Confederation was ill structured,64 as a point of fact, the United 
States government had “done many of the highest acts of sovereignty.”65  
Among the most vital of these—beyond declaring war, establishing an army 
and navy, issuing money, making alliances with foreign powers, and forging 
a peace treaty—was the “declaration of independence”—the act of deciding 
that British Americans were an independent nation.66  These feats of high 
sovereignty implied that the national government had been vested, from the 
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beginning, with many (if not, perhaps, all) inherent national powers.67  
While, for political reasons, it was surely necessary to call a general 
convention to redraw the formal outlines of national power, Hamilton, the 
prodigiously talented New Yorker, claimed that it would be every bit as 
legitimate for Congress to merely “resum[e] and exercis[e] the discretionary 
powers . . . originally vested in them.”68 
As the decade unfolded, Hamilton broadened his argument.  Primarily in 
the context of defending former loyalists against what he took to be punitive 
postwar laws, he emphasized the obligations that the law of nations had 
placed on the United States.69  Because, in his judgment, New York’s anti-
loyalist legislation violated the peace treaty that Congress had negotiated 
with Britain and other European nations, the legislation violated the law of 
nations.70  In making these arguments, Hamilton was further stressing the 
essential ways in which the United States had behaved as a sovereign nation 
and assumed the responsibilities of one.  In claiming that the separate states 
were obligated to comply with the law of nations as well as the nation’s treaty 
obligations, Hamilton underscored the legal existence of the nation.71 
Hamilton offered a conspicuous account of incipient nationhood and the 
exercise of its concomitant power.  But even if he pointed to the nation’s 
legal existence, he had not quite offered an account of that nation’s origins 
or political foundations.  That task would fall to other nationalist-minded 
champions of constitutional reform. 
James Wilson, the Pennsylvania lawyer and adroit constitutional thinker, 
helped fill in the gaps that Hamilton had left—all while offering the most 
penetrating account of American nationhood and power advanced in the 
years prior to the Constitutional Convention.72  Like Hamilton, Wilson had 
served in Congress and helped lead the nationalist charge from its earliest 
days.73  Also like Hamilton, he simultaneously favored constitutional change 
on the ground that the Confederation government was much too weak, while 
defending that same government’s unrecognized inherent powers.74  Unlike 
Hamilton, however, he tethered a recognition of nationhood and inherent 
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national power to an account of the nation’s underlying social compact, 
explaining more precisely why an American nation existed and how that fact 
impacted the resulting delegation of authority to that nation’s government.75 
Wilson did so in defense of the national government’s authority under the 
Articles of Confederation to establish the nation’s first national bank:  the 
Bank of North America.76  The Articles had both failed to enumerate the 
relevant power and also made clear that the state governments retained all 
powers “not . . . expressly delegated.”77  Nevertheless, Wilson explained, the 
inquiry needed to begin not with the Articles but rather with the Declaration 
of Independence—which, he contended, had established not thirteen 
autonomous states but a single nation, and with it, a national people.78  
Consequently, the government presiding over that nation was the creation, 
not of the people of the states but of the sovereign people of the United States.  
This meant that the national government derived its powers from two 
separate sources:  some were expressly delegated by the states through the 
Articles, but others “result[ed] from the union of the whole.”79  “The United 
States,” Wilson contended, “have general rights, general powers, and 
general obligations, not derived from any particular States, nor from all the 
particular States . . . but resulting from the union of the whole.”80  Any power 
that was “general” in character—that which the separate states could not 
competently exercise on their own—was delegated independent of the 
states.81  Upon separating from Great Britain, those powers were assigned to 
the Union as a whole and the subsequent “confederation,” Wilson stressed, 
did not “weaken or abridge the powers and rights, to which the United States 
were previously entitled.”82  These broad powers did not amount to national 
plenary power—many significant powers were reserved to the states.83  But 
there was considerable space between a national government vested with 
plenary authority and one that was limited to formally delegated powers.84  It 
was easy to reject the latter without embracing the former, and Wilson 
assumed, drawing on social contract theory, that a credible account of 
national power rested somewhere between those poles.85 
Wilson had established, to his satisfaction, a basis for a national social 
compact.  Independence had created a national people, not merely a 
collection of distinct peoples in distinct states.  The Declaration of 
Independence itself—by speaking on behalf of a plural noun, “these UNITED 
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colonies”—recognized that broader collective.86  Because a national people 
and a national polity preceded the Articles of Confederation, the 
Confederation government derived its authority every bit as much from the 
nation that it governed as it did from the states that delegated particular 
powers to it.87  “To many purposes,” Wilson wrote, “the United States are to 
be considered as one undivided, independent nation; and as possessed of all 
the rights, and powers, and properties, by the law of nations incident to 
such.”88  The nature of the Union dictated the powers of government, so for 
Wilson, and nationalists to follow,89 it made all the difference in the world 
that the nation had come first. 
III.  CONSTITUTING A NATION:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
This form of nationalist thinking, which assumed that a national social 
contract had been forged through the act of independence, emerged swiftly 
and potently at the Constitutional Convention.  In an early debate with Luther 
Martin over the nature of the Union, Wilson brandished the Declaration90 
and quoted from it at length (something that was highly unusual for the 
time),91 confident that it confirmed that “the United Colonies” were 
originally “independent, not Individually but Unitedly.”92  Independence had 
brought a national people into being and with it a national social compact.  
The task in Philadelphia was to devise a new constitution for that particular 
compact.  Hamilton immediately “assented to the doctrine of Mr. Wilson,” 
denying (no doubt based on his own earlier reflections on the subject) “the 
doctrine that the States were thrown into a State of nature” through 
independence.93  Wilson even insisted that “[i]n the beginning . . . congress 
themselves were as one state”—a single national body presiding over a 
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nation.94  At this time, he suggested (rather implausibly but in order to stress 
his own point about the Declaration) “dissentions or state interests were not 
known.”95 
Rufus King, a leading nationalist from Massachusetts, agreed but took the 
point in a different direction.  Because they did not precede the nation, 
“[n]one of the states are now sovereign or independent,” he declared.96  They 
were, in fact, “subordinate corporations or Societies.”97  “If they formed a 
confederacy in some respects,” importantly, “they formed a Nation in 
others.”98  It was not out of necessity or the needs of confederation that so 
“[m]any . . . essential rights are vested in congress,” King explained.99  There 
was a crucial, underlying reason why “[n]one of the states, individually or 
collectively, but in congress, have the rights of peace or war.”100  That was 
because, as he tellingly put it, “[t]his is a union of the men of those states.”101  
Indeed, a “Union of the States is a union of the men composing them, from 
whence a national character results to the whole.”102  The Union was a 
compact of a national people, of individuals who lived in separate states but, 
from the standpoint of sovereignty, were not of the separate states.  “To 
certain points,” King therefore proclaimed, “we are now a united people.”103  
“Consolidation,” he observed, “is already established.”104  As Hamilton had 
argued several years earlier, it was already a brute fact.105  This was why 
King considered “the proposed Government as substantially and formally, a 
General and National Government over the people of America”—precisely 
because it was over the people of America, rather than the people of the 
several states.106  These arguments regarding the nature of the polity 
provided a crucial foundation from which so many other delegates claimed 
throughout the Convention that, as Hamilton put it, the “national government 
ought . . . to have full sovereignty.”107 
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The nationalist understanding of the polity also shaped the drafting of the 
Constitution in profound ways.  In particular, it no doubt shaded how many 
delegates understood the enumeration of legislative powers that were 
eventually written into Article I.  The mere fact of the enumeration did not 
mean, to their eyes, that national power was limited to it.  As John Mikhail 
has shown, with his theory of delegated national authority surely in mind, 
Wilson dramatically revised what became the Necessary and Proper Clause 
while serving on the Committee of Detail (the committee charged with 
compiling a working draft of the Constitution roughly halfway through the 
Convention).108  The national legislature would enjoy the power to make all 
necessary and proper laws, not only to carry out its “foregoing powers” (those 
enumerated in what would become Article I, Section 8) but also “all other 
Powers” that had been vested “in the Government of the United States.”109  
This clause confirmed that there were “other Powers,” independent of 
anything enumerated, that were delegated to the national government as a 
whole, based on the character of the preexisting union.  These revisions 
provided a textual reminder of what nationalists already assumed to be the 
case:  that certain national powers resulted from the formation of the 
American Union itself.110  These powers were not “vested” via text but 
through an entirely different mechanism.  And thus, the phrase “this 
Constitution,” found in the “necessary and proper” clause and elsewhere 
throughout the document, described not merely the textual content being 
written in Philadelphia but also, necessarily, the underlying constitution of 
the polity on which that text would fundamentally be based.  Those powers 
“vested” by “this Constitution,” therefore, could not be identified solely 
based on the expressed text found in the written Constitution, because the 
content of “this Constitution” was as much a function of the kind of sovereign 
people who had established it as it was the discrete textual provisions written 
into it. 
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Wilson’s Committee of Detail work was soon fortified by his nationalist 
ally, Gouverneur Morris, on the Committee of Style—which was assigned 
the task of producing a final draft of the Constitution.111  Morris, quite 
possibly with Wilson’s assistance,112 dramatically reworked the 
Constitution’s Preamble (which Wilson had initially drafted on the 
Committee of Detail).113  Of enormous importance for the nationalist cause, 
the final version unambiguously established “We the People of the United 
States” as the Constitution’s founding agent.114  Especially when combined 
with what punctuated the document—rules for ratification that empowered 
the people themselves, acting through special ratifying conventions, rather 
than the state legislatures, to consider the new Constitution115—these 
opening words did away with the lingering residue of the Articles.  Even 
under the Articles, the states could only delegate and retain those powers they 
could competently exercise;116 but now, by so dramatically undermining the 
states’ claims to sovereign authority, the Constitution further underscored the 
primacy of the Union.  Or so nationalists believed.117  In addition, and as 
important, the final Preamble specified six specific purposes for which the 
new national government would be established—including the need to 
“promote the General Welfare”118—which could be read as the referent of 
the “all other powers” so conspicuously referenced in the revised “necessary 
and proper” clause:  a set of national ends that a national people licensed its 
national government to pursue.119 
The Preamble was proof positive of the importance of social contract 
theory to the nationalist view.  It served as the clearest evidence imaginable 
of how so many Federalists understood the nature of the American social 
compact and thus, would have read the final Constitution.120  Like the “all 
other powers” clause, the Preamble did not vest any power in the new 
government but rather reinforced what was already believed to be vested,121 
 
 111. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 92, at 547, 553 (documenting the appointment 
of a committee “to revise the style of and arrange the articles agreed to” and listing Gouverneur 
Morris as a committee member); id. at 565–80 (documenting the committee’s final work). 
 112. Even though Wilson was not formally appointed to the Committee of Style, he might 
have unofficially helped with the final drafting.  Based on a visit with Convention delegate 
Abraham Baldwin of Georgia, Ezra Stiles of Connecticut recorded in his diary that Baldwin 
had claimed “Messrs Morris & Wilson had the chief hand in the last Arrangt & Composition” 
of the Constitution. See Ezra Stiles, Diary (Dec. 21, 1787), reprinted in 3 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 97, at 168, 170. 
 113. William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Dishonest Scrivener:  Gouverneur Morris 
and the Creation of the Federalist Constitution, 119 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) 
(manuscript at 78–87), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3383183 [https:// 
perma.cc/UHT8-LZGV]. 
 114. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 115. Id. art. VII. 
 116. See WILSON, supra note 59, at 10. 
 117. See Gienapp, The Myth of the Constitutional Given, supra note 15, at 198–99. 
 118. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 119. Mikhail, The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language, supra note 15, at 1097–
103. 
 120. See supra notes 113–19 and accompanying text. 
 121. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text. 
2021] IN SEARCH OF NATIONHOOD AT THE FOUNDING 1801 
serving as both proof of a particular understanding of the federal Union and 
reminder of what necessarily followed from that fact.  As under the Articles, 
the proposed national government lacked plenary authority.  But thanks to 
the polity set to establish it, the government would enjoy vastly more 
authority than the sum of enumerated powers expressed in the written 
Constitution.  As far as nationalists were concerned, the national government 
would have all of the power entitled to a government established by a national 
people and its nation—no more, no less. 
IV.  WE THE PEOPLE VS. WE THE STATES:  RATIFICATION 
During ratification, several nationalists drew out these readings, appealing 
to social contract theory to explicate and defend the proposed Constitution.  
James Wilson, fresh off his command performance in Philadelphia, was 
especially eager to ground understanding of the new system of government 
in a debate over the nature of the polity.122  What was the Constitution and 
who had authorized it?  Critics were confused on both counts, Wilson 
contended, for contrary to what they maintained, “[t]his . . . is not a 
government founded upon compact.”123  That was because “[t]here can be 
no compact unless there are more parties than one,”124 and the Constitution 
recognized but one party:  “WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES.”125  If 
one studied the Preamble and the document as a whole, “the system itself 
tells you what it is,” Wilson stressed.126  It was neither a treaty nor a peace 
pact; rather, “it is an ordinance and establishment of the people”—a national 
people.127 
Of course, many founding-era Americans sharply disagreed with the 
nationalists’ aims, but beginning with the ratification debates, to a striking 
degree, disputes over the Constitution were defined on the nationalists’ 
terms.128  Indeed, it was precisely because nationalists such as Wilson, 
Morris, King, and Hamilton were right—if not about how much national 
power was preferable, then about the relationship between the constitution of 
the polity and the constitution of its government—that opponents found the 
proposed Constitution so threatening.129 
The Preamble immediately caught anti-Federalists’ attention.  “I confess,” 
Samuel Adams uneasily reported, “as I enter the Building I stumble at the 
Threshold.  I meet with a National Government, instead of a f[e]deral Union 
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of Sovereign States.”130  At its “very commencement,” observed Cincinnatus 
in direct response to Wilson, the Constitution “prescribe[s] this remarkable 
declaration—We the People of the United States.”131  Patrick Henry echoed 
this sentiment most famously, asking why the Constitution began:  “We, the 
People, instead of We, the States?”132  While Henry’s quip is best known, it 
was hardly the only one. 
The Preamble proved so threatening because anti-Federalists perfectly 
understood, much as Federalists did, that it revealed something substantive 
about the kind of union the United States would be under the Constitution.  
The proposed Constitution presupposed a certain kind of federal polity, one 
that revealed it to be “a compact between individuals entering into society,” 
William Findley observed, “and not between separate states enjoying 
independent power and delegating a portion of that power for their common 
benefit.”133  Indeed, Robert Whitehill claimed in the Pennsylvania ratifying 
convention, the Preamble showed “the principle of confederation excluded, 
and a new unwieldy system of consolidated empire . . . set up upon [it].”134  
Thanks to what it said about the underlying polity, anti-Federalists assumed, 
the Constitution entitled the national government to more power than was 
expressly enumerated.  “The inference is natural,” Brutus complained,135 
based on “the great end of the constitution . . . to be collected from the 
preamble,”136 that “the [national] legislature will have an authority to make 
all laws which they shall judge necessary for the common safety, and to 
promote the general welfare.”137  These implications were only reinforced, 
an anti-Federalist author writing under the pseudonym “An Old Whig”138 
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believed, by the inclusion of a clause “for carrying into execution ALL OTHER 
POWERS,” which indicated that “other powers may be assumed hereafter as 
contained by implication in this constitution.”139  Nationalists were not alone 
in their reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in particular Wilson’s 
strategic changes to it. 
Those Federalists who were less committed to expansive national power, 
such as James Madison, worked to reassure anti-Federalists that the proposed 
Constitution delegated powers that were, in fact, “few and defined.”140  
Though, importantly, Madison’s disagreement with the nationalists did not 
stop there.  Despite supporting the Constitution, he resisted the nationalist 
account of union.  While it might have seemed, Madison argued, “that the 
Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of 
America,” on closer examination, that “assent and ratification is to be given 
by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation; but as 
composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively 
belong.”141  Therefore, the “act . . . establishing the Constitution,” he 
concluded, “will not be a national but a federal act.”142  Madison thus 
believed that national powers under the Constitution would be “few and 
defined,” in part, because a nonnational people were set to establish its 
legitimacy.143 
Nationalists such as Wilson, who insisted, in contrast to Madison, that the 
Constitution would be “ordained and established by the people 
themselves”144 because “[t]here can be no compact unless there are more 
parties than one,”145 nonetheless, on account of the rhetorical and political 
needs of the moment, offered their own reassurances to anti-Federalists.  
Being the skilled lawyer that he was, however, Wilson made sure to leave 
room for his own genuine understandings of national power and union.  For 
instance, “where the powers are particularly enumerated,” he pledged “the 
implied result is, that nothing more is intended to be given, than what is so 
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enumerated, unless,” he made sure to add, “it results from the nature of the 
government itself.”146  The federal government would be able to exercise 
only those powers delegated to it, but that, of course, raised the question of 
how power was delegated under a constitution like the one proposed in the 
first place.  Here, Wilson reminded careful listeners:  “I consider the people 
of the United States, as forming one great community,” while “the people of 
the different states” formed communities “on a lesser scale.”147  “From this 
great division of the people into distinct communities,” he went on, different 
allotments of power were “given to the governments, according to the nature, 
number, and magnitude of their objects.”148  Those objects were a function 
of the polity that constituted the government.  The sum of delegated authority 
was limited to what happened to be enumerated if—and only if—the 
underlying polity happened to be a collection of sovereign states rather than 
a far-flung sovereign people.  If it was the latter—as nationalists insisted it 
was—then the sum of delegated power was greater than if it was not. 
No matter how many Federalists hinted otherwise to help ensure 
ratification, therefore, few skeptics were pacified by these assurances 
because the Federalists’ foundational assumption resonated.  Most assumed 
that there was indeed an inescapable relationship between the constitutional 
text and the underlying polity, one that could not be ignored. 
V.  DEBATING NATIONAL POWER THROUGH THE NATURE OF THE POLITY 
After ratification, these fault lines continued to shape constitutional debate 
in profound ways.  To an extent often not appreciated, defenders of national 
power instinctively appealed to the kinds of nationalist social contract 
arguments that had emerged in the 1780s and to powerful effect. 
They did so in a range of important debates, though perhaps nowhere quite 
as significantly as during the debate over Alexander Hamilton’s proposed 
national bank.149  In the House of Representatives, bank defenders appealed 
to the nature of the polity and government with as much frequency as they 
parsed the Constitution’s textual commands.  They claimed, as Wilson and 
King had earlier, that the national government’s power was shaped by the 
character of the underlying federal union:  “by the very nature of 
government,” contended Fisher Ames, the quick-witted representative from 
Massachusetts, “the legislature had an implied power of using every mean 
not positively prohibited by the constitution, to execute the ends for which 
that government was instituted.”150  The Preamble, he continued, “vested 
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Congress with the authority over all objects of national concern or of a 
general nature.”151 
Numerous bank defenders echoed Ames.  “The principles of the 
government and ends of the constitution,” John Laurance declared, “were 
expressed in the preamble.”152  Among those principles was the fact of a 
national people and polity.  As John Vining of Delaware explained, by virtue 
of the Declaration of Independence, the United States “derive[d] all the 
powers appertaining to a nation,” which included the specific “power under 
consideration”—the right to charter a national bank.153 
When it came time for Hamilton to offer his own opinion on the 
constitutionality of the proposed bank, he too relied on social contract 
principles to justify a more expansive set of powers for the national 
government, though his appeal to these precepts was subtler.154  He did not 
underscore the Preamble, nor did he speak explicitly about a national people 
having formed a national polity.155  But he did allude to the formation of 
political society to justify a broad interpretation of the Constitution’s powers.  
“[A]ll government is a delegation of power,” he wrote, and “how much is 
delegated in each case” turned on “fair reasoning & construction upon the 
particular provisions of the constitution—taking as guides the general 
principles & general ends of government.”156  Interpretation needed to be 
guided by a fair assessment of the general principles and ends of government, 
something to be derived from the formation of the underlying social 
compact.157  With these ends of government in mind, it was fair to assume 
that “the powers contained in a constitution of government . . . ought to be 
construed liberally, in advancement of the public good.”158  Because the 
American people had entered into a common political society—that is, 
because they had formed a national social compact—the government 
established for that society was necessarily empowered to promote the 
general welfare.159  As long as a liberal exercise of power was “not contrary 
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to the essential ends of political society,” then that government was justified 
to pursue the general purposes for which that society had been established in 
the first place.160  To an important degree, then, Hamilton based his argument 
on an account of the nation’s underlying compact. 
Even more emphatically, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Chisholm v. 
Georgia,161 orchestrated by leading nationalists Justice James Wilson and 
Chief Justice John Jay, firmly relied on social contract theory.  The entire 
question of whether states could be sued by residents of other states came 
down, in their minds, to the nature of the United States itself—to what kind 
of people and community had given life to the Constitution.162  The 
distribution of sovereignty in the Union tracked the nature of the Union and 
turned on the kind of people that had brought it into being.  The 
Constitution’s text did not, and could not, stand alone.  Its meaning was, 
ultimately, a function of the kind of sovereign agent who had authorized it 
and, in turn, the kind of union for which that sovereign agent spoke.  Just as 
in the eyes of leading Federalists it was impossible to determine whether the 
national government enjoyed a power to charter a national bank without first 
understanding the character of the Union,163 so too was it impossible to sort 
out state suability (and related issues of retained sovereignty) by simply 
fixating on the Constitution’s expressed text.  The issue in Chisholm turned 
on a question that preceded the text:  whether the United States was a nation 
of genuine legal standing.164 
In determining the issue in question, Wilson dissected principles of general 
jurisprudence, the laws and practices of the various states, and the law of the 
Constitution.165  But all of this detailed analysis was preceded by a more 
basic consideration, one that ultimately shaped and, in many ways, drove the 
remainder of the inquiry.  “The question to be determined,” he stated at the 
outset, 
is, whether this State, so respectable, and whose claim soars so high, is 
amenable to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States?  
This question, important in itself, will depend on others, more important 
still; and, may, perhaps, be ultimately resolved into one, no less radical than 
this—“do the people of the United States form a Nation?”166 
Here was the foundational question. 
Answering it required probing the nature of sovereignty in the United 
States and particularly the ways in which the American Revolution had 
transformed it.  In taking stock of Americans’ recent history, Wilson 
remarked that all too often states and sovereigns had been conflated, a 
mistake Americans had not made.  “To the Constitution of the United States,” 
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he explained, “the term SOVEREIGN, is totally unknown.  There is but one 
place where it could have been used with propriety . . . .  [the] ‘SOVEREIGN’ 
people of the United States.”167  Neither the nation-state nor the individual 
states that comprised the American Union were sovereign.168  Only the 
people who had brought both kinds of states into being merited that exalted 
designation.169  (This, among many reasons, was, to Wilson’s mind, why 
Blackstone’s theory of law, based on the command of a superior 
governmental sovereign, was so deeply mistaken.)170  If “the majesty of the 
people,” rather than “the prerogative of Kings” or the “sovereignty of 
[s]tates” (the conventional focus of political and legal writing), was the only 
authority known in the wake of the Revolution, then the question boiled down 
to:  which kind of people?171 
For Wilson, the answer was clear:  a national people.  “[O]ur national scene 
opens with the most magnificent object, which the nation could present,” he 
averred, “‘[t]he PEOPLE of the United States’ are the first personages 
introduced.”172  And, quoting the Preamble, he continued “[i]n order, 
therefore, to form a more perfect union, to establish justice, to ensure 
domestic tranquillity, to provide for common defence, and to secure the 
blessings of liberty, those people, among whom were the people of Georgia, 
ordained and established the present Constitution.”173  Consequently, Wilson 
concluded, taking “a combined and comprehensive view, the general texture 
of the Constitution” confirmed that “the people of the United States intended 
to form themselves into a nation for national purposes.”174 
Jay offered a comparable analysis.  The matter of whether Georgia, or any 
other state, enjoyed sovereign immunity turned on the Constitution’s legal 
foundations.  And on this score, what mattered above all was that “the people, 
in their collective and national capacity, established the present 
Constitution.”175  Jay based this conclusion primarily on a historical account.  
“The Revolution, or rather the Declaration of Independence,” he observed, 
“found the people already united for general purposes.”176  He continued: 
From the crown of Great Britain, the sovereignty of their country passed to 
the people of it; and it was then not an uncommon opinion, that the 
unappropriated lands, which belonged to that crown, passed not to the 
people of the Colony or States within whose limits they were situated, but 
to the whole people . . . .177 
 
 167. Id. at 454 (emphasis omitted). 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. 
 170. Id. at 458. 
 171. Id. at 463 (emphasis omitted). 
 172. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 173. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 174. Id. at 465 (emphasis omitted). 
 175. Id. at 470. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
1808 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
Echoing Wilson’s argument in defense of the Bank of North America,178 Jay 
stressed that the act of declaring independence from Britain had established 
a national people.  This national people then gave voice to “their own proper 
sovereignty” in “declar[ing] with becoming dignity, ‘We the people of the 
United States, do ordain and establish this Constitution.’”179  “Here we see,” 
Jay noted, “the people acting as sovereigns of the whole country and in the 
language of sovereignty, establishing a Constitution by which it was their 
will that the State Governments should be bound, and to which the State 
Constitutions should be made to conform.”180  Everything came down to the 
fact that a national people had brought the American legal order into being. 
Of course, Chisholm caused consternation, and the Eleventh Amendment 
eventually nullified its narrow holding.181  But even if some people at the 
time and many since have assumed that the Amendment established a broader 
principle of state sovereign immunity, there is no reason to believe that 
nationalists concluded that the amendment undermined the broader account 
of national popular sovereignty on which the Court’s decision had been 
based.  To at least nationalist eyes, the Eleventh Amendment protected states 
from retrospective liability on claims predating the Constitution.182  But that 
said nothing about claims incurred thereafter.183  Nor, more importantly, did 
it unsettle the fundamental principle announced in Chisholm, which remained 
as undeniable as it had been since the Constitution took effect:  that the 
people of the United States, as a national people, had created a nation.184 
Wilson’s and Jay’s enquiries requires reinforced what so many nationalists 
had to that point maintained:  that the Preamble, far from the rhetorical 
flourish to which it would later be reduced,185 was the key to unlocking the 
Constitution.  It revealed what sort of thing the Constitution was, by 
confirming what kind of people and polity it represented.  It was evidence of 
the Union’s underlying social contract.  Beneath a national constitution could 
be found a national people.  It was, thus, utterly misguided—not to mention 
legally mistaken—to view the Constitution as a treaty or anything 
comparable.  It was no such thing.  It was a national constitution, and each 
of those words mattered.  As a constitution, it was predicated on the sovereign 
will of a people.  As a national constitution, it was predicated on the 
sovereign will of a national people.  Its character and authority could not be 
divorced from the social compact that undergirded it. 
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During the Constitution’s earliest years, leading nationalists routinely 
transformed debates over the limits of national power into ones over the 
nature of the American polity.186  Building on the ideas they had first 
articulated in the 1780s, they imagined that national constitutional 
interpretation was tightly entangled with issues of nationhood.  Sorting out 
the Constitution’s meaning required deciphering its underlying social 
contract—grasping the compact and polity that preceded the constitution of 
government.  Whoever tried to limn the boundaries of national power based 
solely on a textual analysis of the Constitution’s words betrayed ignorance 
of what they were reading and the kind of legal content it contained—or so 
Federalists insisted, time and again. 
VI.  COMPACT THEORY:  THE ULTIMATE CONCESSION 
Strikingly, nationalists’ argument proved so resonant that their intellectual 
opponents would come to tacitly agree with its underlying premise.  Possibly 
the strongest evidence of that argument’s resonance has been hiding in plain 
sight.  Only because nationalists were right about the implications of social 
contract theory were anti-nationalists compelled to invent compact 
theory187—the idea that the federal Union was a compact among sovereign 
states rather than a national contract among the individuals of the United 
States.188  They conceded that the scope of the national government’s 
authority was indeed determined by the nature of the preceding political 
compact (the two-step logic of social contract theory), while denying 
nationalists’ account of step one (the nature of the social compact found in 
the United States). Rather than challenge nationalists’ logic, in other words, 
anti-nationalists tried to refute the argument on its own terms.  This implies 
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something striking about founding-era constitutional assumptions and thus 
the conceptual background against which the original Constitution was set. 
Initially, skeptics of national power, most of whom rallied behind Thomas 
Jefferson’s and James Madison’s opposition to the Washington 
administration, and particularly Hamilton’s policies within it, tested different 
arguments.  Among other things, they pressed the Constitution’s text into 
service, hopeful that they could confine the national government’s powers to 
the express terms of the document.  In the debate over the national bank, they 
countered defenses of far-reaching national power by contending that, as 
Madison famously argued, the Constitution’s “essential characteristic” was 
that it established a government “of limited and enumerated powers.”189  
William Branch Giles of Virginia took this argument a step further, asserting 
that “the peculiar nature of this government” lay in the fact that it was 
“composed of mere chartered authorities.”190  Accordingly, any “authority 
not contained within that charter” was off-limits.191  The soon-to-be Tenth 
Amendment, which declared that the states retained all powers not delegated 
to the federal government, Giles argued, underscored this essential point.192  
Throughout the 1790s, as the nation divided into discernible political 
coalitions, these became common refrains among Jeffersonian 
Republicans.193 
Yet, strikingly, champions of strict enumerated powers and the 
Constitution’s written character recognized that limiting the scope of the 
federal government’s power required challenging nationalists’ account of 
federal union.  Pointing to the enumeration of legislative powers or clamoring 
about the Tenth Amendment only reinforced that the debate turned not on the 
Constitution’s written content but on the operative meaning of “delegated.”  
To claim that something about the Constitution’s writtenness settled the 
matter already presupposed a robust understanding of how federal power 
was, as an initial matter, delegated and, thus, what kind of polity had 
constituted the federal government in the first place.  That Republicans did 
not ultimately rest their case on the inherent limitations of enumerated 
powers but instead based it on a rival account of federal union, is conspicuous 
acknowledgement that, to their minds, nationalists’ core premise was correct. 
Republicans, consequently, began trumpeting compact theory.  According 
to the dominant version of this theory, there was no people of the United 
States, no national social contract.  There were peoples of the various states, 
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each of whom had created separate polities through state-level social 
contracts.194  These states had then compacted together to form a union, and 
this was why federal power was inherently limited.  Republicans, in other 
words, accepted the premise, if not the conclusion, of nationalists’ argument.  
At the Constitutional Convention, Gouverneur Morris had “explained the 
distinction between a federal and national, supreme, Govt.; the former being 
a mere compact . . . the latter having a compleat and compulsive 
operation.”195  Because, he went on, “in all communities there must be one 
supreme power,” the question of delegated authority thus turned on whether 
or not the United States formed one single political community.196  Defeating 
nationalists’ sweeping claims that the federal government could broadly 
interpret the Constitution to promote the national public good meant cutting 
them at their roots.  It required demonstrating that the Union was not a single 
political community but, in fact, several.  It meant taking Morris’s logic and 
distinctions seriously and, based on them, reaching an alternative conclusion. 
When defending compact theory in 1798 in the Kentucky Resolutions, 
Thomas Jefferson did just this.  His arguments could not have been more 
revealing.  The Constitution, he asserted, was a “compact under the style and 
title of a Constitution for the United States.”197  This phrasing is worth a 
careful look.  No matter the Constitution’s own style and form, which 
otherwise seemed to present it as a constitution (signaled nowhere more 
clearly than in the Preamble), it was actually something else entirely:  a 
compact.198  This foundational statement colored everything that followed, 
including especially what came next.  The resolutions claimed that the 
“several states composing the United States of America . . . [had] constituted 
a General Government for special purposes, delegat[ing] to that Government 
certain definite powers” while “reserving . . . the residuary mass” to 
themselves, meaning any assumption on the part of the national government 
of “undelegated powers” was, accordingly, “void, and of no force.”199  These 
claims about enumeration and the express delegation and reservation of 
powers rested on the initial premise that there was no federal polity and that 
the “style and form” of the Constitution was misleading.200 
These arguments became doctrinaire among Republicans.  Virginian John 
Taylor claimed that “the people in state conventions,” in their capacity as the 
peoples of the individual states, were “incontrovertibly the contracting 
parties” of the Constitution.201  In The Report of 1800, written in defense of 
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the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, Madison similarly regarded “the 
people composing” the “political societies” of the various states as having 
acted “in their highest sovereign capacity” when they ratified the 
Constitution.202  Meanwhile, a few years later, in 1803, the leading legal 
theorist of the Republican movement, St. George Tucker,203 systematically 
defended this point in an extensive essay appending his annotated (and 
Americanized) edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries.204  The federal 
government’s powers were confined to those written, Tucker argued, because 
the Constitution was a compact among sovereign states; there was no national 
polity, just a national government brought into being by separate peoples in 
separate states.205  There was no escaping, it seemed, the recognition that 
constitutional powers derived, in some significant sense, from the nature of 
the American Union.  Republicans certainly seemed content to argue on the 
terms that Federalists had so spiritedly defended and leveraged to such effect. 
Why, we ought to ask, did Republicans feel a need to construct compact 
theory?  Why did they not simply fall back on strict construction or point to 
the Constitution’s enumerated powers or putative writtenness?  Because, it 
would seem, they believed that Federalists were right:  if, as a point of fact, 
there was a national polity, then the national government would indeed have 
claim to more power than if there was not.  Compact theory was designed to 
deny the existence of a federal polity, of a national social compact, of a 
nation.206  This only made sense in the context of social contract theory and 
what it implied about the Union:  that there were two constitutions (one for 
the polity and another for the government), the first of which necessarily 
informed and shaped the second.  Jefferson’s comments, in particular, are so 
revealing and so rarely appreciated for what they imply.  Republicans could 
not concede, ultimately, that the federal Constitution was a constitution—it 
had to be something else.  If it was a constitution, if it spoke for a nation and 
a national people, then all bets were off.  Few developments more powerfully 
underscore the nation’s importance—as a legal category at the founding—
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than the emergence of compact theory.  That Jeffersonians assumed, as a 
matter of course, that their vision of limited constitutional power was 
incompatible with the existence of a national polity confirms as much. 
CONCLUSION 
If we begin to understand why Federalists were so obsessed with 
nationhood, and the creative constitutional thinking that grew out of that 
obsession, we can bring back into focus a cluster of assumptions that were 
once inseparable from efforts to interpret the Constitution.  At the founding, 
constitutional interpretation and social contract theory were often tightly 
connected. 
We are not beholden to anything Federalists or their opponents thought.  
We need not assume, as they once did, that questions of constitutional 
meaning and interpretation were inextricably entangled with questions of 
sovereignty and union.  Maybe, heeding Don Herzog’s recent advice, we will 
decide that sovereignty is a concept that has outlived its usefulness.207  
Maybe, in our modern age, on the other side of positivist and historicist 
revolutions that have fundamentally remade how we think about legal 
authority and its fundamental basis, we will have little interest in social 
contract theory and its attendant natural law assumptions.  Maybe, especially 
in the wake of the Civil War, we will decide it is tedious to sort out quasi-
metaphysical questions regarding the character of our federal polity and 
instead be content with focusing on how the federal system works in practice 
rather than theory.  Maybe, in short, it just does not matter anymore whether, 
constitutionally speaking, our polity was born a nation or a set of independent 
states. 
But what we cannot do is claim to be interested in recovering, describing, 
or understanding the original Constitution, while ignoring the social contract 
assumptions that Federalists and their opponents treated as foundational.  
There is nothing wrong with reading the Constitution apart from any 
particular understanding of federal union—times change, after all.  But if the 
point is to understand the Constitution as it once was—to recover the 
meaning it might have had at its inception—then we need to appreciate what 
reading the Constitution necessarily entailed.  We cannot start with the 
document or its words; we need to start with the Union for which it spoke.  
Originally, the Constitution was inseparable from theories of federal union.  
If we disaggregate one from the other, we do not clear the way for clearer 
interpretation.  To the contrary, we simply wrench the Constitution out of the 
eighteenth century and transform it into something it originally was not.  We 
leave behind the past and make the Constitution an artifact of the present.  If 
then our goal is to confront the original Constitution on its own terms, we 
need to understand why Federalists and, in turn, their opponents, cared so 
deeply about the state of the nation. 
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